Report on
the Battle of Little Big Horn
Major M.A. Reno
Camp on the
Yellowstone River, 5 July 1876
The command of the regiment
having developed upon me as the senior surviving officer from the
battle of the 25th and 26th of June, between the Seventh Cavalry and
Sitting Bull's band of hostile Sioux, on the Little Big Horn River, I
have the honor to submit the following report of its operations from
the time of leaving the main column unitl the command was united in
the vicinity of the Indian village:
The regiment left the camp
at the mouth of the Rosebud River, after passing in review before the
department commander, under command of Bvt. Maj. Gen. G. A. Custer,
lieutenant-colonel, on the afternoon of the 22nd day of June, and
marched up the Rosebud 12 miles and encamped; 23rd, marched up the
Rosebud, passing many old Indian camps, and following a very large
pole-trail, but not fresh, making 33 miles; 24th, the march was
continued up the Rosebud, the trail and signs freshening with every
mile, until we had made 28 miles, and we then encamped and waited for
information from the scouts. At 9:25 p.m. Custer called the officers
together and informed us that beyond a doubt the village was in the
valley of the Little Big Horn, and in order to reach it it was
necessary to cross the divide between the Rosebud and the Little Big
Horn, and it would be impossible to do so in the day-time without
discovering our march to the Indians; that we would prepare to march
at 11 p.m. This was done, the line of march turning from the Rosebud
to the right up one of its branches which headed near the summit of
the divide. About 2 a.m. on the 25th the scouts told him that he could
not cross the divide before daylight. We then made coffee and rested
for three hours, at the expiration of which time the march was
resumed, the divide crossed, and about 8 a.m. the command was in the
valley of one of the branches of the Little Big Horn. By this time
Indians had been seen and it was certain that we could not suprise
them, and it was determined to move at once to the attack. Previous to
this, no division of the regiment had been made since the order had
been issued on the Yellowstone annuling wing and battalion
organizations, but Custer informed me that he would assign commands on
the march.
I was ordered by Lieut. W.
W. Cooke, adjutant, to assume command of Companies M, A, and G;
Captain Benteen of Companies H, D, and K. Custer retained C, E, F, I,
and L under his immediate command, and Company B, Captain McDougall,
in rear of the pack- train.
I assumed command of the
companies assigned to me, and, without any definite orders, moved
forward with the rest of the column, and well to its left.
I saw Benteen moving
farther to the left, and, as they passed, he told me he had orders to
move well to the left, and sweep everything before him. I did not see
him again until about 2.30 p.m. The command moved down to the creek
toward the Little Big Horn Valley, Custer with five companies on the
right bank, myself and three companies on the left bank, and Benteen
farther to the left, and out of sight.
As we approached a deserted
village, and in which was standing one tepee, about 11 a.m., Custer
motioned me to cross to him, which I did, and moved nearer to his
column until about 12.30 a.m. when Lieutenant Cook, adjutant, came to
me and said the village was only two miles above, and running away; to
move forward at as rapid a gait as prudent, and to charge afterward,
and that the whole outfit would support me. I think those were his
exact words. I at once took a fast trot, and moved down about two
miles, when I came to a ford of the river. I crossed immediately, and
halted about ten minutes or less to gather the battalion, sending word
to Custer that I had everything in front of me, and that they were
strong. I deployed, and, with the Ree scouts on my left, charged down
the valley, driving the Indians with great ease for about two and a
half miles. I, however, soon saw that I was being drawn into some
trap, as they would certainly fight harder, and especially as we were
nearing their village, which was still standing; besides, I could not
see Custer or any other support, and at the same time the very earth
seemed to grow Indians, and they were running toward me in swarms, and
from all directions. I saw I must defend myself and give up the attack
mounted. This I did. Taking possession of a front of woods, and which
furnished, near its edge, a shelter for the horses, dismounted and
fought them on foot, making headway through the woods. I soon found
myself in the near vicinity of the village, saw that I was fighting
odds of at least five to one, and that my only hope was to get out of
the woods, where I would soon have been surrounded, and gain some high
ground. I accomplished this by mounting and charging the Indians
between me and the bluffs on the opposite side of the river. In this
charge, First Lieut. Donald McIntosh, Second Lieut. Benjamin H.
Hodgson, Seventh Cavalry, and Acting Assistant Surgeon J. M. De Wolf,
were killed.
I succeeded in reaching the
top of the bluff, with a loss of three officers and twenty-nine
enlisted men killed and seven wounded. Almost at the same time I
reached the top, mounted men were seen to be coming toward us, and it
proved to be Colonel Benteen's battalion, Companies H, D, and K. We
joined forces, and in a short time the pack-train came up. As senior,
my command was then A, B, D, G, H, K, and M, about three hundred and
eighty men, and the following officers: Captains Benteen, Weir, French
and McDougall, First Lieutenants Godfrey, Mathey, and Gibson, and
Second Lieutenants Edgerly, Wallace, Varnum, and Hare, and Acting
Assistant Surgeon Porter.
First Lieutenant De Rudio
was in the dismounted fight in the woods, but, having some trouble
with his horse, did not join the command in the charge out, and hiding
himself in the woods, joined the command after night-fall on the 26th.
Still hearing nothing of
Custer, and, with this re-enforcement, I moved down the river in the
direction of the village, keeping on the bluffs.
We had heard firing in that
direction and knew it could only be Custer. I moved to the summit of
the highest bluff, but seeing and hearing nothing sent Captain Weir
with his company to open communication with him. He soon sent word by
Lieutenant Hare that he could go no farther, and that the Indians were
getting around him. At this time he was keeping up a heavy fire from
his skirmish line. I at once turned everything back to the first
position I had taken on the bluffs, and which seemed to me the best. I
dismounted the men and had the horses and mules of the pack-train
driven together in a depression, put the men on the crests of the
bluffs, and which seemed to me the best. I dismounted, the men and had
the horses and mules of the pack-train driven together in a
depression, put the men on the crests of the hills making the
depression, and had hardly done so when I was furiously attacked. This
was about 6 p.m. We held our ground, with a loss of eighteen enlisted
men killed and forty-six wounded, until the attack ceased, about 9
p.m. As I knew by this their overwhelming numbers, and had given up
any support from that portion of the regiment with Custer, I had the
men dig rifle pits, barricade with dead horses and mules, and boxes of
hard bread, the opening of the depression toward the Indians in which
the animals were herded, and made every exertion to be ready for what
I saw would be a terrific assault the next day. All this might night
the men were busy, and the Indians holding a scalp-dance underneath us
in the bottom and in our hearing. On the morning of the 26th I felt
confident that I could hold my own, and was ready, as far as I could
be, when at daylight, about 2.30 a.m., I heard the crack of two
rifles. This was the signal for the beginning of a fire that I have
never equaled. Every rifle was handled by an expert and skilled
marksman, and with a range that exceeded our carbines, and it was
simply impossible to show any part of the body before it was struck.
We could see, as the day brightened, countless hordes of them pouring
up the valley from the village and scampering over the high points
toward the places designated for them by their chiefs, and which
entirely surrounded our position. They had sufficient numbers to
completely encircle us, and men were struck from opposite sides of the
lines from where the shots were fired. I think we were fighting all
the Sioux Nation, and also all the deparadoes, renegades, half-breeds,
and squaw-men between the Missouri and the Arkansas and east of the
Rocky Mountains, and they must have numbered at least twenty-five
hundred warriors.
The fire did not slacken
until about 9.30 a.m., and then we found they were making a last
desperate effort and which was directed against the lines held by
Companies H and M. In this charge they came close enough to use their
bows and arrows, and one man lying dead within our lines was touched
with the coup-stick of one of the foremost Indians. When I say the
stick was only ten or twelve feet long, some idea of the desperate and
reckless fighting of these people may be understood.
This charge of theirs was
gallantly repulsed by the men on that line, lead by Colonel Benteen.
They also came close enough to send their arrows into the line held by
Companies D and K, but were driven away by a like charge of the line,
which I accompanied. We now had many wounded, and the question of
water was vital, as from 6 p.m. the previous evening until now, 10
a.m., about sixteen hours, we had been without.
A skirmish line was formed
under Colonel Benteen to protect the descent of volunteers down the
hill in front of his position to reach the water. We succeeded in
getting some canteens, although many of the men were hit in doing so.
The fury of the attack was now over, and to our astonishment the
Indians were seen going in parties toward the village. But two
solutions occured to us for this movement; that they were going for
something to eat, more ammunition, (as they had been throwing arrows,)
or that Custer was coming. We took advantage of this lull to fill all
vessels with water, and soon had it by camp- kettles full. But they
continued to withdraw, and all firing ceased save occasional shots
from sharp-shooters sent to annoy us about the water. About 2 p.m. the
grass in the bottom was set on fire and followed up by Indians who
encouraged its burning, and it was evident to me it was done for a
purpose, and which purpose I discovered later on to be the creation of
a dense cloud of smoke behind which they were packing and preparing to
move their village. It was between 6 and 7 p.m. that the village came
out from behind the dense clouds of smoke and dust. We had a close and
good view of them as they filed away in the direction of the Big Horn
Mountains, moving in almost perfect military order. The length of the
column was full equal to that of a large division of the cavalry corps
of the Army of the Potomac as I have seen it in its march.
We now thought of Custer,
of whom nothing had been seen and nothing heard since the firing in
his direction about 6 p.m. on the eve of the 25th, and we concluded
that the Indians had gotten between him and us and driven him toward
the boat at the mouth of the Little Big Horn River. The awful fate
that did befall him never occurred to any of us as within the limits
of possibility.
During the night I changed
my position in order to secure an unlimited supply of water, and was
prepared for their return, feeling sure they would do som as they were
in such numbers; but early in the morning of the 27th, and while we
were on the qui vire for Indians, I saw with my glass a dust
some distance down the valley. There was no certainty for some time
what they were, but finally I satisfied myself they were cavalry, and,
if so, could only be Custer, as it was ahead of the time that I
understood that General Terry could be expected. Before this time,
however, I had written a communication to General Terry, and three
volunteers were to try and reach him. (I had no confidence in the
Indians with me, and could not get them to do anything.) If this dust
were Indians it was possible they would not expect any one to leave.
The men started, and were told to go as near as it was safe to
determine whether the approaching column was white men, and to return
at once in case they found it so, but if they were Indians to push on
to General Terry. In a short time, we saw them returning a note from
Terry to Custer saying Crow scouts had come to camp saying he had been
whipped, but that it was not believed. I think it was about 10.30 a.m.
when General Terry rode into my lines, and the fate of Custer and his
brave men was soon determined by Captain Benteen proceeding to the
battle-ground, and where was recognized the following officers, who
were surrounded by the dead bodies of many of their men; Gen G. A.
Custer, Col. W. W. Cook, adjutant; Capts. M. W. Keogh, G. W. Yates,
and T. W. Custer; First Lieuts. A. E. Smith, James Calhoun; Second
Lieuts. W. V. Reily, of the Seventh Cavalry and J. J. Crittenden, of
the Twelfth Infantry, temporarily attached to this regiment. The
bodies of Lieut. J. E. Porter and Second Lieuts. H. M. Harrington and
J. G. Sturgis, Seventh Cavalry, and Asst. Surg. G. W. Lord, U. S. A.,
were not recognized; but there is every reasonable probability they
were killed. It was more certain that the column of five companies
with Custer had been killed.
The wounded in my lines
were, during the afternoon and evening of the 27th, moved to the camp
of General Terry, and at 5 a.m. of the 28th I proceeded with the
regiment to th battleground of Custer, and buried 204 bodies,
including the following-named citizens: Mr. Boston Custer, Mr. Reed (a
young nephew of General Custer,) and Mr. Kellog, (a correspondent for
the New York Herald.) The following-named citizens and
Indians who were with my command were also killed: Charles Reynolds,
guide and hunter; Isaiah Dorman, (colored,) interpreter; Bloody Knife,
who fell from immediately by my side; Bobtail Bull, and Stab, of the
Indian scouts.
After traveling over his
trail, it was evident to me that Custer intended to support me by
moving farther down the stream and attacking the village in flank;
that he found the distance greater to ford than he anticipated; that
he did charge, but his march had taken so long, although his trail
shows that he had moved rapidly, that they were ready for him; that
Companies C and I, and perhaps part of E, crossed to the village or
attempted it; at the charge were met by a staggering fire, and that
they fell back to find a position from which to defend themselves, but
they were followed too closely by the Indians to permit time to form
any kind of a line.
I think had the regiment
gone in as a body, and from the woods from which I fought advanced
upon the village, its destruction was certain. But he was fully
confident they were running away, or he would not have turned from me.
I think (after the great number of Indians that were in the village,)
that the following reasons obtain for the misfortune; His rapid
marching for two days and one night before the fight; attacking in the
day-time at 12 m., and when they were on the qui vire, instead of
early morning; and lastly, his unfortunate division of the regiment
into three commands.
During my fight with
Indians, I had the heartiest support from officers and men, but the
conspicuous services of Bvt. Col. F. W. Benteen I desire to call
attention to especially, for if ever a soldier deserved recognition by
his Government for distinguished services he certainly does. I inclose
herewith his report of the operations of his battalion from the time
of leaving the regiment until we joined commands on the hill. I also
inclose an accuate list of casaulties, as far as it can be made at the
present time, separating them into two lists: A, those killed in
General Custer's command; B, those killed and wounded in the command I
had.
The number of Indians
killed can only be approximated until we hear through the agencies. I
saw the bodies of eighteen, and Captain Ball, Second Cavalry, who made
a scout of thirteen miles over their trail, says that their graves
were many along their line of march. It is simply impossible that
numbers of them should not be hit in the several charges they made so
close to my lines. They made their approaches through the deep gulches
that led from the hill-top to the river, and, when the jealous care
with which the Indian guards the bodies of killed and wounded is
considered, it is not astonishing that their bodies were not found. It
is probable that the stores left by them and destroyed the next two
days was to make room for many of these on their travois. The
harrowing sight of the dead bodies crowning the height on which Custer
fell, and which will remain vividly in my memory until death, is too
recent for me not to ask the good people of this country whether a
policy that sets opposing parties in the field, armed, clothed, and
equipped by one and the same Government should not be abolished.
Annual
Report of the Secretary of War, 1876, 44th Congress, 1st Session,
pp. 476-480.
